My doctoral dissertation examines the treatment of executive bills during passage through the Russian State Duma, the lower house of the bicameral federal parliament, the Federal Assembly. 

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that legislatures in non-democracies simply 'rubber stamp' executive decisions, I present evidence inconsistent with this model, looking in particular at cases of executive bill failure and amendment. 

I argue that these ostensibly 'deviant' observations are not the result of legislative influence. Rather, executive actors are responsible for the failure of, and changes to, executive-submitted bills. My research demonstrates how legislative institutions are used to help solve intra-executive commitment and monitoring problems. This argument chimes with recent work on coalition government in parliamentary democracies.

I have presented my research findings at various conferences, including the American Political Science Association annual meeting, the Midwest Political Science Association annual conference, and the Comparative Agendas Project annual conference.

This is the dissertation's introductory chapter.